American Motors Corporation emerges in 1954, created from a January 14^th merger of the failing Hudson Motor Car Company and Nash-Kelvinator, an automaker in turn formed by the merger of the Nash automobile firm and the Kelvinator kitchen-appliance company.

In the late 1940s, Nash president George Mason had said that any motor car manufacturer which wanted to survive outside of the Big Three needed to offer something different. This is the philosophy that George Romney, president of AMC, adopts.


Into the '60s, AMC is best known for its Rambler nameplate, which appears on a slew of popular, affordable cars designed by Ed Anderson.

With the departure of president George Romney, Rambler's days are numbered, as AMC under Roy Abernethy begins trying to compete with the Big Three on their flashy, high-budget terms.

The decision to compete in the full-size category, a segment which the Big Three virtually own, proves difficult for the small company. Yet AMC goes out of its way to justify the decision, with more, and more expensive, cars based on larger platforms, like the Marlin and Matador.

Moreover, despite the best efforts of designer Dick Teague, AMC's rather different styling seems more peripheral than revolutionary. Vice-President of Product Development Gerald C. Meyers undoubtedly has it right when he warns, "everything we do must distinguish itself as being importantly different than what can be expected from the competition... Me Too is wrong for American Motors." Yet the company's self-proclaimed Philosophy of Difference is not always different in "important" ways; AMC often foists designs that are too different upon the public.

When sales do not reach their targets, it is then forced to scale back their powertrain options. Press response to the company's efforts is, predictably, negative. AMC re-tools, and the cycle begins again - at higher and higher prices. Meanwhile, AMC's meager revenus leave little room for product improvement in the years that follow.

As Roy D. Chapin replaces Abernethy, AMC reverses course somewhat with the small Gremlin. Its share increases from 4.4% of the 3.9 million small cars sold in 1971, to 6.2% of the 4.8 million sold in 1973.

Gremlin is followed by the bubble-like Pacer, and the four-wheel-drive Eagle.

Pacer, which costs $60 million to develop, proves to be the last all-new, in-house AMC.

"It's an expensive game to be in," muses AMC Vice-President for Styling Dick Teague at the launch of the Pacer wagon.

"We probably count our pennies closer than anyone else, but there's no really cheap way, you know. There are shortcuts, but basically it's an expensive game.

"I don't think the person who buys a new car even dreams that it costs $600,000 to tool a hood, and that a pair of doors is $3.5 million" (Popular Mechanics, October 1976).

In 1970, AMC usurps Kaiser Jeep Corp. for $85 million, receiving the Jeep brand. The company is a combination of Willys-Overland; Studebaker; Packard, and Kaiser-Fraser.


By the late-70s, AMC is reeling fom having placed itself in virtually every Big Three market, in stark contrast to former CEO George Romney's idea of "hitting them where they ain't."

Finding itself desperately needing a fuel-efficient car, AMC sells a 5% stake to Renault in January 1979, upping it to 23% by October. In time, Renault will control nearly half of AMC, in return for a hefty infusion of new capital.

Renault, a pioneer in front-wheel drive, had been the largest U.S. automotive importer in the '50s, but had lost its way Stateside by the '70s.

The French are keen to gain access to AMC's dealer network. Renault, the world's 6^th-best selling nameplate and one which could trace its history back to the turn of the century, was decidedly under-represented in the U.S. It counted just 250 dealerships (of 18,000 worldwide), selling just 18,000 Renaults in America per year.

Meanwhile, AMC counts roughly 1,900 dealers.

The AMC/ Renault X42 project - the Renault Alliance of 1982 - is billed as the Next Big Thing.

At the close of 1980, AMC faces a $155 million loss as Jeep sales fall in the wake of the second gas crisis. The company drops behind Volkswagen in U.S. sales statistics. An additional $122 million buys Renault a controlling interest (46.4%) of AMC. The company now counts about 1,200 dealers, but work on the X42 project continues. The 18i and Fuego will tide the alliance over until X42's launch.

Alliance debuts for 1983. Initially, the front-wheel-drive subcompact is off to a strong start. Yet with the end of the second gas crisis, the market turns toward large cars again. Moreover Renault's takeover of AMC is regularly plagued by Renault's cultural insensitivities.

The French lose patience. They begin looking for a way out, even it means leaving their new, larger Medallion (R21) and Premier (R25) for someone else to sell.

AMC is offered to Fuji; Daihatsu, and Nissan. Its buyer is found when, in 1986, the company accepts a contract from Chrysler to build the large, M-Body Dodge Diplomat and Chrysler Fifth Avenue at Kenosha.


In 1987, Chrysler, under buy-and-sell Iacocca, purchases AMC for $1.7 billion as Renault departs the U.S. market. The package includes AMC's 1,400-strong dealer network; the Jeep brand, and the brand new ($700 million) Bramalea, Ontario plant.

The takeover, though widely questioned at the time (perhaps by the same breed of analysts who loved the DaimlerChrysler merger), gives Chrysler that most American and potent of icons, Jeep.

It should also be noted that Renault/ AMC's front-wheel-drive projects help drive Chrysler into the '90s. Existing AMC designs and personnel are instrumental in transforming Chrysler, getting the company through its second crisis in the early '90s. AMC had become accustomed to being a plucky little player in a highly competitive market, and its product development practices were considerably more streamlined than Chrysler's.

Writes Car and Driver Editor-at-Large Brock Yates, "initially, the small band of AMC managers was treated more like refugees from a defeated nation." Yet the AMC alumni soon become crucial to Chrysler's continued survival and success. Recalls one AMC executive, "(unlike Chrysler) we were already operating with teams at AMC, if for no other reason than we did not have enough money or personnel to do otherwise."

Most notably, Francois Castaing retained his seven hundred engineers at Chrysler as Chief Engineer. AMC President Joe Cappy stayed on, as did key AMC people in quality control; large-car design; sales, and marketing.

The original Jeep Grand Cherokee, which sold 230,000 copies in 1998 alone, was an AMC design. The LH sedans borrowed substantially from the Eagle Premier, itself based on the Renault 25. Premier had sold poorly, but its engineering was fundamentally sound. Its legacy lives on in the North-South orientation of the LH model's engines (restricting engine vibrations front-to-back, less noticeable than side-to-side), and in the Dodge Viper's rear disc brake design.


Today, AMC is but a memory, and its famous Kenosha, Wisconsin plant is now gone. Author Patrick Foster puts it best: "as a people, we are poorer by the loss of American Motors.

"Not so much because we will never buy an AMC car, but rather because we no longer have the option of buying an AMC car. Our choice in the market is now that much less.

"The old line independent automakers have been replaced now by a new generation of multi-nationals with Japanese names, and if truth be told, they are very fine cars.

"What they lack is personality and eccentricity, and yes, heritage and history" (American Motors - The Last Indepdent, Patrick R. Foster).